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Improving Patent Quality:
Evaluating the PTO’s Jurisdiction for Patent
Reexamination to Compensate for Changing
Validity Standards
Adam Aquino1

P

atent law in the United States recently underwent significant
reform, and continues to be the subject of significant political
discussion. Contemporary patent reform was ushered in with
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) in 2011, which was the
most significant alteration to patent law in over fifty years. Despite
signing into law the AIA, President Obama stated that patent reform
“only went about halfway to where we need [it] to go,”2 and urged
Congress to pass “a patent reform bill that allows . . . businesses to
stay focused on innovation.”3
Current patent reform efforts are targeting patent assertion entities (PAEs)—entities whose primary business model entails acquiring patents with the sole intent of suing others for infringement. As a
result, PAEs have developed a reputation as patent system exploiters,
often pejoratively referred to as “patent trolls.” Although large cor1
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porations have significant disputes against PAEs, these “trolls” have
largely earned their notoriety by using their superior know-how of
the patent system to profit from lawsuits against those inadequately
equipped to defend themselves, such as start-up technology companies and small businesses.
Various aspects of the PAE business model are being examined
and critiqued to advance current patent reform efforts. Unpopular
tactics used by PAEs include waiting until after industry participants
have made irreversible investments before asserting patent claims,
concealing their identity by creating shell companies, requiring
those who settle to sign non-disclosure agreements to continue to
conceal their identity, leveraging the cost of litigation against potential infringers to elicit a settlement, and suing without the threat
of countersuit due to their non-practicing nature. In addition, PAEs
are often accused of acquiring patents “whose claim boundaries are
unclear” or overly broad.4 Many of these patents, when litigated, are
invalidated. While all of the aforementioned issues are significant,
this paper will primarily examine the issue of substandard patents—
patents of dubious merit likely to be invalidated if their validity were
challenged.
Research suggests that a large percentage of patents, particularly
those asserted by PAEs, are invalidated in court.5 However, many
alleged infringers with smaller budgets are reluctant to litigate, as
litigation is particularly expensive for the defensive party. Currently,
reexamination is allowable for any enforceable patent at the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) if a petitioner submits
prior art that raises a “substantial new question of patentability.”6
The reexamination eligibility requirements were expanded under the
post-grant review provision of the AIA for the most recently granted
applications to include statutory considerations. Since the courts
4
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continue to establish new fundamental doctrines concerning the appropriate scope of patent applications, alleged infringers should have
an alternative to costly litigation in the courts to determine patent
validity, particularly of those patents granted before patent narrowing doctrines were established. Extending the eligibility requirements allowable under the post-grant review provision of the AIA
may lessen the negative impact that substandard patents impose on
the patent system.
The paper is structured as follows: Part I will discuss the background information regarding the current patent system. Part II will
discuss problems arising as a result of substandard patents. Part III
will review current procedures of patent reexamination. A discussion of how the courts approach patent validity, and how they clarify
the definitions governing patentability will be covered in part IV.
Part V will evaluate the current process of reexamination and will
submit a partial solution. Part VI will address opposing views to the
expansion of reexamination. Finally, part VII will address the opposing views.

I. Background
The foundation for intellectual property legislation in the United
States is given, as follows, in the Constitution: “The Congress shall
have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.”7
The purpose of the patent system in the United States is to promote innovation for the general benefit of society. It was thought that
an inventor would lack the requisite motivation to discover and to
implement useful inventions without certain protections from those
who, seeking profit, would duplicate those inventions without the
burden of development. Additionally, it was thought that if inventors
had motivation to disclose details of their inventions to the public domain, the gained insight from these disclosures would spur further
research and innovation.
7
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Over time, certain standards were established in the United
States Code (USC), and they are currently enforced by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) along with the judicial
courts. The USC states that only a process, a machine, an article
of manufacture, a composition of matter, or improvements thereon
can be patented.8 Laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas are not patentable. In addition, the law requires that the patented invention be novel, nonobvious, adequately described or enabled
(for one of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention),
and claimed by the inventor in clear and definite terms.9
When inventors seek to apply for patent protection, they (or a
certified patent agent or attorney) file an application demonstrating
compliance with the above-mentioned criteria. The part of a patent
that defines the scope of the protection granted by the patent monopoly is known as the claims. In addition to the claims, a written description (specification) is accompanied by an appropriate figure set
describing (or “adequately enabling”) the invention in detail.10 Once
submitted, the patent application undergoes examination where an
examiner carefully reads the application to ascertain not only the
validity of the claims, but also that the claims are supported in the
written description and figures such that a person having ordinary
skill in the art (PHOSITA) could reproduce the disclosed invention.11
Any discrepancy in the claims with the legal standard found by an
examiner is disclosed to the submitting party. While the specification of the invention cannot be substantially altered once submitted, the claims may be justified or changed to conform to the legal
standard. Once the examiner has approved the claims, inventors are
granted exclusive rights to their inventions for a finite period of time
(approximately twenty years from the filing date). A record of the
8
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communication between the PTO and the patent owner is held publicly available.
The value of a patent is largely measured by the extent to which
it excludes competitors from a given market. In other words, a valuable patent will cover a considerable amount of patentable “space.”
As a result, inventors are economically motivated to acquire patents
with broadly defined claims. If the claims are too narrow, the scope
of the protection granted by the patent is significantly impeded, devaluating the patent. Examiners are tasked with assuring that inventors are only granted claims deemed valid under the definitions
previously mentioned.
In order for examiners to reject a claim, they must find evidence
that the substance of the claim has been previously disclosed in the
prior art. Prior art may include previously granted patents, marketed
technologies, textbooks, academic journals, etc. In short, prior art
is all the information disclosed to the public domain before a patent
application is submitted. Considering the boundless volume of prior
art in existence, the scope of prior art searches performed by patent
examiners is necessarily limited.

II. Problems Arising from Substandard Patent Applications
Ideally, the patent system mutually benefits both the inventors
and the public; inventors are granted exclusive rights to their inventions in exchange for a frank disclosure that would not otherwise
be publicly available. The goal, therefore, of a patent system is to
establish and enforce a standard that effectively balances the value
of disclosure against the economic loss incurred as a result of the
patent monopoly. However, a patent system that grants patent monopolies too liberally may disproportionately favor private inventors
at the public’s expense. When such is the case, consumers are unnecessarily subjected to inflated prices resulting from the monopoly,
resources may be diverted from pursuing related research on the basis of avoiding allegations of infringement, and patent owners may
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find more value in patent assertion and royalty collection than in the
manufacture and sale of a product.12
A preliminary study conducted in 2007 claims that substandard
patents are responsible for an economic loss of 25.5 billion dollars
annually.13 Of that 25.5 billion, 21 billion is associated with deterring
valid research, and 4.5 billion is estimated to come from litigation
and administrative costs associated with substandard patents.
While substandard patents are owned by a variety of parties,
PAEs are receiving most of the negative political attention for their
behavior associated with the assertion of substandard patents. A recent study shows that a high percentage of cases litigated involving
PAEs result in patent invalidation, suggesting that PAEs are more
likely to possess and assert a substandard patent than are practicing
entities.14 This assertion is supported by statistics demonstrating the
overall percentage of invalidated patents subject to litigation is significantly lower than the proportion of invalidated patents litigated
by PAEs.15

III. Patent Reexamination
After a patent is granted, there are certain allowances by which
the patent’s validity can be challenged. Any third party may submit
at any time additional prior art or written “statements of the patent
owner filed in a proceeding before a Federal court,” to be included
in the official file of a patent.16 While this can appear to make tactical sense in cases where the patent in question is likely to undergo
reexamination, there is little this provision actually provides to as12
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sure that the additional submitted prior art is considered to invalidate
questionable patent claims. If a third party, presumably a potential or
alleged infringer, wants to take a more aggressive approach to invalidate an enforceable patent, they may request that the PTO perform a
reexamination. The USC states that “any person at any time may file
a request for reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on
the basis of any prior art.”17 Once a request for reexamination is submitted, the director of the PTO decides “whether a substantial new
question of patentability affecting any claim of the patent concerned
is raised by the request.”18
Upon the PTO director’s approval, an examiner is assigned to
reexamine the application in light of, but not limited to, the additional prior art submitted by the third party. When a third party is
included in the negotiations arguing the validity of a patent between
an inventor and an examiner, the examination is referred to as inter partes reexamination. When negotiations involve only the patent
owner and the PTO, the examination is known as ex partes reexamination. In an inter partes examination, the third party bringing the
argument against the patent cannot remain anonymous. In an ex partes examination, the third party may remain anonymous. This helps
eliminate worries that submitting an argument against an existing
patent would make the third party more vulnerable to a countering
infringement lawsuit.
In addition to ex partes and inter partes reexaminations, the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) implemented a post-grant
review process; within nine months of the granting of a patent, a
petitioner may request reexamination “on any ground that could be
raised regarding . . . novelty, obviousness, written description, enablement, [or] indefiniteness.”19 This is a significant change in the
scope of reexaminable patents, as ex partes and inter partes reexami-
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nations are only granted on the basis of prior art that raises concerns
of novelty and obviousness.

IV. The Courts
Courts’ decisions often clarify the terminology used in the law,
and redefine or reinterpret certain norms that are applied not only
to patents granted after the courts’ decisions, but to all enforceable
patents ex post. The courts’ decisions significantly impact how legal
principles regarding patent validity are interpreted both in the courts
and at the PTO. Consequently, significant patent reform regarding
principles of invalidity occurs outside of the Legislature through
the courts. Doctrines established in the courts, such as the Supreme
Court and the Federal Circuit, have substantially affected the way
examiners (and other judges) measure patent validity. In this section,
several examples of the evolution of the interpretation of patent legislation in the United States Patent System will be discussed.
(i) Obviousness
Prior to 1850, novelty and utility were the only two standards
used to measure patent validity. Non-obviousness was introduced as
a requirement for patent validity in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.20 The
patent being disputed related to “an improvement in making doors
and other knobs.” The judge ruled that “if no more ingenuity and
skill was necessary to construct the new knob than was possessed
by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent
was void.”21 The court in the Hotchkiss case established precedent
to reject the validity of certain patent applications based on obvious substitution of known materials. However, the standard was not
consistently applied until the requirement of non-obviousness was
codified in the Patent Act of 1952, which states that “A patent for a
claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between
the claimed invention and the prior art are such that the claimed
20

Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850).

21

Id. at 284.
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invention as a whole would have been obvious before the effective
filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”22
After non-obviousness was added to the U.S.C., the application
of the law varied widely between examiners and courts. In Graham
v. John Deere, the Supreme Court further clarified the non-obviousness standard in an effort to make the interpretation of requirement
more uniform.23 They ruled as follows:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims
at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the
obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized to give light to the circumstances.24
In short, Graham allowed for increased discretion to be applied when
ascertaining the obviousness of a given invention. These factors of
determining obviousness (often referred to as Graham factors) were
applied in patent validity cases thereafter, such as in Anderson’sBlack Rock, Inc v. Pavement Salvage Co., Dann v. Johnston, and
Sakraida v. Ag Pro., Inc.
Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc v. Pavement Salvage Co. further
established a “synergism standard,” which suggested that “combinations of elements resulting in more than the sum of their individual
parts constitute evidence of nonobviousness.”25 This standard was
later rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
As time progressed, a “motivation-suggestion-teaching” (MST)
standard was established, which stipulated that in order to reject a
patent for obviousness, there had to exist a motivation or a teaching
in the prior art for a combination of ideas expressed in more than one
22
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23
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art reference. Under the MST standard, patent applications became
harder to reject on the basis of obviousness, as examiners and judges
needed to find explicit evidence in the prior art suggesting a combination of ideas evident in a patent claim.
The MST standard was challenged, and ultimately deemphasized in KSR v. Teleflex, where the Supreme Court ruled that a “person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an
automaton.”26 KSR, in essence, allowed for a more liberal application
of patent rejection on the basis of obviousness. This type of reasoning was soon implemented in the Federal Circuit.27
(ii) Non-Patentable Subject Matter
For many years, patents claims covering the use of certain discovered genes were considered valid. A recent court case challenged
this presumption. Myriad Genetics obtained extensive patent coverage after discovering the composition and location of the BRCA1
and BRCA2 genes, which are critically important in diagnosing a
person’s risk to certain types of breast and ovarian cancer. Myriad’s
patents gave it “exclusive right to isolate an individual’s BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes, and . . . synthetically create BRCA cDNA.”28 Many
opposed the Myriad patents, considering genes to be unpatentable
because it was a “product of nature.” In Association for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, the Supreme Court ruled that “separating [a] gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act
of invention,” and subsequently invalidated several of the claims in
Myriad’s patents.29 Similar rulings narrowing the definition of “an
act of invention” have occurred regarding method claims in software
and biotechnology patents.
The fluxing standards of patent validity pose a substantial challenge to a patent system that oscillates between definitions of pat26

KSR v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 1, 17 (2007).

27
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28
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29
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entable subject matter in an effort to optimize the benefits between
patent owners and the public; this challenge is largely due to the fact
that continuously changing standards may only be reasonably applied to previously granted patent applications through litigation and
reexamination.

V. Evaluating the Reexamination Requirements
It is useful to distinguish the differences in methodologies used
by courts as opposed to the PTO to determine patent validity. At
the PTO, examiners are, by definition, PHOSITAs with a detailed
understanding of the legal requirements associated with patent validity. Examiners, therefore, are uniquely qualified to evaluate patent
claims against similar prior art disclosures to determine if patent
protection is warranted. Judges and juries, on the other hand, are
more likely to misunderstand elements of an invention due to a lack
of technical expertise. More particularly, judges and juries are less
likely to understand the extent to which a patent claim overcomes
the closest prior art. Judges and juries are also limited to information presented by counsel, whereas PTO examiners may consider
evidence not disclosed by the petitioner. These differences suggest
that PTO examiners are more likely to find basis for declaring patent
invalidity on grounds of novelty or obviousness than are judges and
juries.30
A recent case illuminates the district court’s acceptance of a
PTO reexamination that conflicted with its own analysis. In Fresnius v. Baxter, a certain patent was being considered simultaneously
by a district court and the PTO.31 The district judge initially found
that the patent was nonobvious. Shortly thereafter, before the case
settled, the PTO found the patent to be obvious, and invalidated all
of the claims. In the end, the district court accepted the PTO’s ruling,
even though it conflicted with the conclusion arrived at in the court.
30

Douglas Duff, The Reexamination Power of Patent Infringers and the
Forgotten Inventor, 41 Cap. U.L. Rev. 693 (2013).

31

Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
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The Fresnius court’s decision ostensibly validates the assertion that
PTO evaluations of invalidity supersede a court’s determination of
validity. It should be noted that the reverse also holds; a court’s “final
judgment of patent invalidity binds the PTO in any concurrent or
future reexamination.”32 This apparent bias towards rulings of invalidity are further shown by recent trends suggesting that patents are
currently being evaluated on stricter standards than were previously
applied both in the courts and the PTO. In other words, there are
probably a lot of patents that, if reexamined, would be invalidated.
As previously mentioned, a number of alleged infringers are
being sued by PAEs. Many times, these alleged infringers do not
challenge the patents in court, not because they lack confidence in
a positive ruling, but because the cost of litigation outweighs the
cost of settling. Reexamination at the PTO is considerably cheaper
than litigation. Smaller entities that tend to be more heavily affected
by patent infringement charges benefit from a reexamination option
through the PTO. However, under current law, a request for reexamination cannot be granted if the third party petitioner does not
provide additional prior art against an enforceable patent, excepting
in cases where the patent was granted within nine months of the
petition.
Many patents are invalidated in the courts not on the merits of
new prior art, but by redefining the standard (or applying an updated
standard) on which the patent is judged. If a patent’s validity can be
litigated in court without additional prior art, why should it be necessary to provide additional prior art references to the PTO in order
to establish a “substantial new question of patentability”?33 In fact,
the shifting standard of patent validity as determined by the courts
often proves to be the most cogent argument against a patent’s validity. Ironically, by law an examiner does not even need to use the
prior art submitted by a petitioner to invalidate a patent subject to
reexamination. Therefore, a third party should be able to petition
32

Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 3, 82
(1997).

33
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for reexamination without having to submit an argument against the
patent’s validity on the basis of prior art. Expanding the availability of post-grant review to include the entire enforceable lifetime of
a patent, and not just within nine months of the patent validation,
would accomplish this improved reexamination.
There are many benefits in increasing the amount with which
patent validity is argued in the PTO and not in the courts. First, this
change could significantly reduce the cost to an alleged infringer to
defend itself. This would lead to more cases being decided on their
merits, rather than being decided by a lack of resources or experience. Second, having the PTO determine validity would decrease
the number of substandard patents in circulation. Third, in addition
to the previously mentioned benefits to third parties, increased determination of patent validity in the PTO has a significant potential
advantage to patent owners; when a patent claim is invalidated in
court, the patent owner loses all rights to the enforceability of those
claims. When a patent claim is rejected in a reexamination, the patent owner has a chance to narrow the claim in order to conform to
the most recent standard. In this way, reexamination can be seen as a
way not only to invalidate claims but to update them. Fourth, when a
patent survives a reexamination, it is perceived as stronger and more
enforceable. For this reason, many patent owners submit their own
patents for reexamination before asserting them.34

VI. Arguments against the Expansion of Reexamination
Significant opposition exists against measures being taken to expand the scope of reexamination in the PTO. One of the most compelling arguments submits that lowering the threshold on granting a
patent reexamination undermines an inventor’s rights by disproportionately favoring infringers. They argue that the government disincentivizes inventors from disclosing new inventions when patents
are too easily invalidated.

34
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Fiscal Year 2012, 179 tbl. 6, 187 tbl. 14A (2012).
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In addition, “decisions affirming patent validity are never final,
while patent invalidity decisions are always final.”35 Even if a court
(or the PTO) rules several times that a patent is valid, one final ruling of invalidation is sufficient to permanently overturn a patent.
Additionally, there is no limit to the number of times a patent can
be challenged and submitted for reexamination. Hypothetically, an
anonymous third party can petition for “serial reexamination with
increasing specificity and success to introduce an endless chain of
challenges to an inventor’s patent rights.”36 Third parties may also
feel more empowered to submit various requests for reexamination
because they may do so anonymously, and thus exploitation of the
reexamination procedures may spin out of control.
This argument is made more valid given that, in reexamination,
“the PTO dispenses with the presumption of validity in reexamination and must demonstrate unpatentability only by a preponderance
of the evidence.”37 This means that no deference is given to the initial
evaluation of the patent. In a way, the patent is examined not only on
the basis of additional prior art submitted or only in light of updates
in the interpretation of the law, but also with respect to the holistic
evaluation by the examiner. This gives rise to a potentially detrimental phenomenon that results when two separate examiners arrive to
differing conclusions concerning “old” questions of patentability as
opposed to “new” ones. This could further encourage anonymous
third parties to serially submit patents for reexamination with the
hopes of getting “lucky” with an examiner.
In addition, it does not seem fair that third parties can submit
reexamination requests that may subsequently force patent owners
to narrow their claims in light of differing requirements, and not
allow patent owners the opportunity to broaden claims through reexamination. While current trends seem to suggest that courts are
more inclined to narrow the scope of patentability, courts may issue
opinions broadening it.
35

Duff, supra note 30, at 701.

36
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Finally, an increase in the demand for patent examinations can
be thought to put too much strain on an already backed up office.38
In other words, an underfunded USPTO would not be able to handle
the increased patent requests that would result from an allowance
of increased reexamination, and the delay in granting new patents
would be increased.

VII. Responding to Counter Arguments
By making stricter requirements for patents, the courts have essentially modified the definition of the word “inventor.” Cases like
KSR v. Teleflex have redefined disclosures previously classified as
“inventions” to obvious combinations of known materials from the
perspective of a PHOSITA.39 This would suggest that, in some cases,
persons who were previously defined as “inventors” would now only
be characterized as PHOSITAs; the former being characterized as
“inventive,” while the latter is only capable of ordinary engineering.
Thus, a change in the law to the detriment of those who are no longer
defined as inventors does not violate the Constitutional mandate to
provide to “inventors exclusive rights to their . . . discoveries.”40
It is also important to note that in order for a reexamination to
be granted, the director of the PTO must determine that there is a
“substantial new question of patentability.”41 Thus, there is some
protection offered towards patent owners from having their patents
subjected to reexamination indefinitely. While it may be inadvisable
to impose a strict limit to reexamination petitions that include new
prior art not considered by the PTO, there may be justification for
applying some limitations on those reexamination petitions that are
challenging patent validity based on patentable subject matter. For
38

Protecting Small Business and Promoting Innovation by Limiting Patent
Troll Abuse: Hearing on S. 1720 Before the U.S. Sen. Judiciary Comm.,
113th Cong. 27 (2013) (statement of Q. Todd Dickinson, Executive Director, American Intellectual Property Law Association).

39
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example, regulations may be put into place that make a previously
reexamined patent harder to reexamine without the submission of
additional art.
Finally, it is important to remember that the party petitioning for
the reexamination, not the patent owner, pays for the reexamination.
It costs a patent owner very little to have a patent reexamined, particularly where the patent is found to be valid. However, when a patent is asserted against an alleged infringer, the cost of defense to the
alleged infringer is significant. Whereas the cost of defense in patent
infringement litigation often makes smaller entities particularly vulnerable to frivolous lawsuits, the nature of the reexamination process
is such that frivolous “reexamination” does not significantly affect
legitimate inventors.

VIII. Conclusion
Substandard patents constitute a significant problem in opposition to the innovator-friendly environment envisioned by patent
system supporters. In order to effectively address continually advancing technology and a fluxing economic environment, the United States Patent System should demonstrate adequate flexibility to
enforce a fluid standard of patentable subject matter. Various court
decisions modifying the definition of what is patentable demonstrate
the need for this flexibility. Expanding the scope of the standard put
forth in the post-grant review provision of the AIA, while not a comprehensive solution to the substandard patent problem, would further
empower the PTO to more effectively enforce a consistent standard
among all enforceable patents. Furthermore, an expansion of the
post-grant review provision would facilitate more periodic updates
among enforceable patents. Problems associated with patent trolling
may be significantly attenuated as a result.

